Recently, we explored the neural substrates of event-time introspection wherein humans report the subjective onset times of conscious cognitive events. We reconstructed spatiotemporal brain activity arising from neural oscillations observed in magnetoencephalographic recordings while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice auditory processing task. We isolated brain activity putatively specific to the cognitive processes underlying event-time introspection and found that event-time introspection was associated with neural activity that was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Our findings indicate that subjective reports of event times should therefore be interpreted as the result of interactions between introspection and experience networks, rather than as direct reproduction of the individual's conscious state.
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We thank Dr. Antonietti for his interest in our paper. His commentary (Antonietti, in press ) is based on the premise that although such event-time judgments have been used in many studies inspired by Libet that investigated the temporal relationship between neural and conscious processes, the design of our study does not make it comparable to "the kind of introspection involved in metacognitive judgements required by other Libet-like experiments".
We are in agreement that, unlike previous work, our study primarily aimed to investigate the neural mechanisms responsible for the introspective assessment of conscious intention time rather than the mechanisms of conscious intention processing itself. Hence, we agree that the scope of our study differed from previous investigations that typically focus on aspects of free-will and volition. It should also be noted that our design included free-choice trials that allowed us to examine introspection networks under conditions of free-choice in motor action vs. cued-choice.
Where we disagree with the commentator is the claim that small differences in the instructions to the participants would "deeply alter" the neural processes of introspection. In contrast to previous studies which instructed subjects to report the time when they "feel the urge to move" (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Sirigu et al., 2004) , or when they "make their conscious motor decision" (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008) , our study instructed subjects to report the time when they "decide to move" (Guggisberg, Dalal, Schnider, & Nagarajan, in press ). We disagree that this difference will preclude our findings to be related to previous Libet-like studies. In fact, a recent study (Miller, Shepherdson, & Trevena, 2011) experimentally confirms one of the conclusions from our paper: the Bereitschaftspotential, which was previously thought to reflect unconscious movement preparation, is in fact largely produced by neural processes related to event-time judgments.
Dr. Antonietti postulates a three level hierarchical model for consciousness, which will require empirical support from future studies that can exploit experimental designs such as ours. While there is evidence for a two-level distinction between primary conscious processing and an introspective meta-consciousness (Marcel, 2003; Schooler, 2002 ) (and our findings further strengthen this notion), it is not yet clear whether we need to model an additional third level. An important testable prediction that emerges from this theoretical model is whether different instructions robustly lead to different activations reflecting this hierarchy in consciousness. Are radically different neural resources recruited based on these subtle changes in instructions? Does introspecting "feel the urge to move" recruit higher-level networks that "decide to move"? Our study actually already provides some evidence against this claim. First, we report brain regions that overlap almost perfectly with regions implicated in previous studies using slightly different instructions (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Sirigu et al., 2004) , and provide an interpretation for these activations. Second, we do not find significant differences in the activation time-courses between free vs. cued trials which suggests that task effects such as volitional control do not alter our results or main conclusions about introspection. Although manipulating instructions were not explicitly tested in our study, our non-significant findings between cued vs. free-choice trials suggest that task differences do not make a difference to our conclusions. Nevertheless, this remains a testable hypothesis.
Yet, even if instruction-related activation differences do occur, the proposed hierarchical 3-level model seems to predict that some instructions activate "level-2" networks in addition to the "level-1" networks examined in our study. Hence, this "level-1" network needs to be activated independent of the instruction given to the participants, and the findings of our study would still apply to all Libet-like studies.
In summary, we emphasize that the central conclusions of our paper related to the existence of an introspection network hold, even if this network reflects so-called "level-1" consciousness. We already acknowledge in our paper that our findings concern the basic event-time introspection and may not necessarily reflect other forms or possible higher levels of introspection.
